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I. INTRODUCTION
In the field of patent law, the doctrine of equivalents extends the
scope of a patent beyond its literal language to cover inconsequential
variations of a patentable invention. Although the doctrine of
equivalents introduces undesirable uncertainty into the scope of pat-
ent protection, both the United States Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have repeatedly reaffirmed the doc-
trine. Nevertheless, the doctrine of equivalents is in decline. The Su-
preme Court significantly limited the doctrine twice in the last ten
years,' and two recent en banc decisions of the Court of Appeals for
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. B.A., M.A., University of
California at Santa Barbara; M.B.A., J.D., University of California at Berkeley. I
am grateful to my colleague, Russell Christopher, for his helpful comments on a
draft of this Article.
1. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002);
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
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the Federal Circuit2 have further restricted the doctrine. In its most
recent case, the Supreme Court grounded its rationale for the doctrine
in the limitations of language.3 Ironically, this rationale presages fur-
ther restrictions on the doctrine because it suggests that the doctrine
is not needed, except in rare cases when language is incapable of de-
marcating the scope of patent protection. Thus, the doctrine of
equivalents appears destined to become a "derelict on the waters of
the law."4
The patent statutes confer on a patentee the exclusive right to
make, use or sell a patented invention in the United States for a
twenty year term. 5 An exclusive right to make, use or sell a patented
invention is not necessarily an economic monopoly, however. Even
though a patentee may have an exclusive right to an invention, the
patentee will not have an economic monopoly if there are alternatives
to the invention that are practical substitutes for it.6 For a patent to
confer a monopoly that has economic value to its owner, its claims
must cover not only the particular device or process the inventor de-
veloped but all of the substitutes for it as well so that "there is no
alternative way for competitors to provide the same economic func-
tionality to their customers without infringing the claims."7 Other-
wise, the patent will have no more value to its owner than a
publication in a technical journal.8
The claims of a patent are analogous to the metes and bounds in a
legal description of real property, and they stake out the intellectual
property that the patent covers. The scope of the claims a patentee is
entitled to is limited both by previous discoveries (i.e., the prior art)
and by the inventor's contributions. In order to be patentable, an in-
vention must be novel,9 and therefore, a claim that intrudes on prior
2. Honeywell Int'l v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en
banc); Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (en banc).
3. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. 722.
4. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 232 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
5. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2), 271 (2000).
6. See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1293 (2006)
("Congress, the antitrust enforcement agencies, and most economists have all
reached the conclusion that a patent does not necessarily confer market power
upon the patentee. Today, we reach the same conclusion ... ."). For an example,
however, of the Supreme Court's blurring the significant distinction between an
exclusive right and a monopoly, see Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 730 ("The patent
laws 'promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts' by rewarding innovation
with a temporary monopoly.").
7. Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1730 (2000).
8. Both a patent and a publication describing an invention qualify as prior art under
35 U.S.C. § 102 to bar another person from obtaining a patent on the invention
and its obvious variations.
9. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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art is invalid. A claim is also invalid if it goes beyond what the inven-
tor actually created and disclosed in the patent application.10
However, patent claims are permitted to cover variations of the in-
vention, even though the inventor did not produce physical embodi-
ments of them, if they would be apparent from the written description
of the invention in the patent application to a hypothetical person of
reasonable skill in the inventor's field."x For example, if the inventor
made a working model out of balsa wood, the claim might state that
the device was constructed of wood; or more generally, of a carbon-
based material; or more generally still, of a rigid material. The claim
might even omit any limitation on materials used to construct the de-
vice so that the claim would extend to any material so long as the
claim satisfies the novelty requirement and it would be apparent to a
person of reasonable skill in the inventor's field how to make the de-
vice from any material based upon what was disclosed in the patent
application.
It is the responsibility of the patent attorney to draft claims that
not only are valid but also cover variations of the invention so that
they provide meaningful protection. There are a variety of reasons,
however, why patent claims may fail to cover every variation of the
invention that would be apparent to a person of reasonable skill in the
inventor's field. The most obvious is that the claims drafter may not
foresee all the variations that would be apparent to a person of reason-
able skill in the inventor's field. Another reason is that the claims
drafter may inadvertently omit an obvious variation or include an un-
necessary limitation in the claims as a result of a mistake. Alterna-
tively, a patent attorney may narrow a broad claim by amendment
during the patent prosecution process in response to a patent exam-
iner's rejection of the claim. Finally, it is conceivable that variations
that are apparent with the benefit of hindsight may not have been
foreseeable to a person of reasonable skill in the inventor's field at the
time the patent application was filed.
10. See Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co. (The Incandescent Lamp Pat-
ent), 159 U.S. 465, 474 (1895) ("If the description be so vague and uncertain that
no one can tell, except by independent experiments, how to construct the pat-
ented device, the patent is void."); Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) ("The purpose of [35 U.S.C. § 112 1] is to ensure that the scope of the
right to exclude as set forth in the claims, does not overreach the scope of the
inventor's contribution to the field of art as described in the patent
specification.").
11. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 [ 1; Nat'l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys.
Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("The scope of the claims must be less
than or equal to the scope of enablement. The scope of enablement, in turn, is
that which is disclosed in the specification plus the scope of what would be known
to one of ordinary skill in the art without undue experimentation.").
2006] 1115
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
The doctrine of equivalents expands the scope of patent protection
in some circumstances to cover variations of the invention that are not
within the literal terms of the claims. While there is no statutory ba-
sis for the doctrine of equivalents, and it has been characterized as an
anomaly, 12 the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the doctrine
over the past 150 years.' 3 Although the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts continue to recognize the doctrine of equivalents, they
have not clearly defined the circumstances in which it is available, nor
demarcated the extent to which it expands the scope of patent protec-
tion. The consequent lack of certainty has adverse consequences for
both patentees and their competitors because determining whether
potentially competing products are infringing may require an expen-
sive jury trial with the risk of damages and injunctive relief. A major
source of this uncertainty is the fact that neither the Supreme Court
nor the lower federal courts have articulated a convincing rationale
for the doctrine of equivalents.
This Article provides a critical analysis of the doctrine of
equivalents. In Part II, the Article describes the evolution of Ameri-
can patent law from central claiming to peripheral claiming. Next,
Part III discusses a statutory vestige of central claiming that is found
in paragraph 6 of section 112 of title 35 of the United States Code for
particular types of claims having a combination of elements. Part IV
surveys the four leading Supreme Court cases addressing the doctrine
of equivalents and discusses the limitations these cases have placed
on the doctrine. Part V summarizes the current law and discusses
future prospects for the doctrine of equivalents.
II. THE CENTRAL DEFINITION AND PERIPHERAL
DEFINITION SYSTEMS
Patents have not always included claims. The earliest patent stat-
ute in the United States, the Patent Act of 1790, required only a
specification in writing, containing a description, accompanied with drafts or
models... which specification shall be so particular, and said models so exact,
as not only to distinguish the invention or discovery from other things before
known and used, but also to enable a workman or other person skilled in the
art or manufacture, whereof it is a branch, or wherewith it may be nearest
connected, to make, construct, or use the same, to the end that the public may
have the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of the patent term. 14
12. Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1948)
(Hand, J.).
13. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732-33
(2002); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997);
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950);
Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 342 (1854).
14. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110.
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In the absence of claims, the invention was defined using a central
definition system. 15 The patent contained only a description of a par-
ticular embodiment of the invention, and the courts extended patent
protection to all equivalent embodiments.1 6 Under a central defini-
tion system, a doctrine of equivalents was needed to prevent competi-
tors from copying the invention but avoiding infringement by making
minor changes to the particular embodiment described.
Although it was not necessary under a central definition system to
describe variations of an invention in order to define it more broadly,
there was nothing to prevent an applicant from doing so. Describing
variations of an invention in the patent application might facilitate a
court's later finding infringement if a defendant produced one of the
variations. Also, defining an invention broadly in the patent applica-
tion served to give better notice of the scope of the invention to the
public than setting out only the single embodiment that the inventor
had made. For example, a patent from 1799 included the following
expansive language: "The drawings accompanying this description are
not laid down by any scale of measurement because the forms, sizes,
and the proportions of the whole and its parts may be indefinitely va-
ried."17 The first claims appeared in Robert Fulton's patent for a
steamboat.18
The earliest statutory reference to claims appeared in the Patent
Act of 1836, which provided that an inventor "shall particularly spec-
ify and point out the part, improvement, or combination, which he
claims as his own invention or discovery." 19 While the general prac-
tice after 1836 was to include one or more claims after the description
of the invention,20 they merely served to highlight what the inventor
considered were the most significant aspects of the invention.21 In-
15. Exparte Fressola, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1608, 1609 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1993);
RIDSDALE ELLIS, PATENT CLAIMS 4 (1949).
16. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 957-58 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(Newman, J., commentary) ("A finding of infringement did not require precise
correspondence between the description and the accused device. The trial courts
determined, often by jury, whether there was 'substantial similarity' between the
accused device and that described in the patent."); Fressola, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1609; ELLIS, supra note 15, at 4.
17. Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 134,
135 (1938).
18. It has been noted that Fulton may have really been more the inventor of the
claim than of the steamboat. William R. Woodward, Definiteness and Particular-
ity in Patent Claims, 46 MIcH. L. REV. 755, 758 (1948); Lutz, supra note 17, at
137.
19. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119.
20. ELLIS, supra note 15, at 3.
21. See Pennwalt Corp., 833 F.2d at 959 (Newman, J., commentary) ("[In the period
from 1836 to 1870] patent claims played a quite limited role in patent enforce-
ment, serving more to identify the essential features of an invention than to set
limits to the scope thereof."); ELLIS, supra note 15, at 3 ("[Between the 1836 and
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fringement was not determined on the basis of the claims;22 instead,
the trier of fact determined infringement by comparing the plaintiffs
and defendant's products to each other.2 3
Patent practice with respect to claims changed with the adoption of
the Patent Act of 1870, which provided that the inventor "shall partic-
ularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combi-
nation which he claims as his invention .. ."24 This language made
claims mandatory, and it is substantially the same as that found in
the current statute.25 After 1870, patent claims practice moved from
the central definition system to the modern peripheral definition sys-
tem, in which the periphery of the area of patent protection is staked
out by the claims, and only products or methods within that area may
be found to be infringing.2 6
Even after the Patent Act of 1870, claims often concluded with gen-
eral language that the invention was "substantially as described,"27
thus referring back to the written description for the scope of the
claim. In 1902, the Commissioner of Patents ruled that this language
was vague, indefinite, and in violation of the requirement to particu-
larly point out and distinctly claim the invention.2S A few years later,
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided that the phrase
"substantially as described" had no legal effect,2 9 and its use gradu-
ally declined after 1914.
The significance of claims is elevated under the peripheral defini-
tion system, because the claims largely define the scope of patent pro-
tection. Patent claims resemble the terms of a prohibitory injunction
in that they set out the activities that constitute infringement of the
patent,30 and like a prohibitory injunction, they must be specific in
1870 Acts] claims ... served merely to call attention to what the inventor consid-
ered the salient features of his invention.").
22. Lutz, supra note 17, at 147 ("During most of [the period from 1836 to 1870] the
claims rarely, if ever, received consideration on the question of infringement.").
23. See Pennwalt Corp., 833 F.2d at 958 (Newman, J., commentary) ("Infringement
continued to be determined [in the period between 1836 and 1870] by compari-
sion of the accused device with the description in the specification."); Lutz, supra
note 17, at 147 ("[Infringement] was almost universally treated as a question of
fact to be decided by the jury from a comparison of the machines of plaintiff and
defendant.").
24. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201.
25. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
26. ELLIS, supra note 15, at 4-10.
27. Id. at 6.
28. Exparte Shepler, 1903 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 17, 102 O.G. 468 (1902), quoted in full
in Nat'l Tube Co. v. Mark, 216 F. 507, 519 n.3 (6th Cir. 1914).
29. Nat'l Tube, 216 F. at 520.
30. Unlike injunctions, however, patent claims are not punishable by contempt of
court, and they are not directed to specific named parties. Injunctive relief is a
significant remedy for patent infringement, and the patent claims will determine
the scope of the injunctive relief for infringement.
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their terms in order to be enforced. 31 Under the peripheral definition
system, the patent applicant can define the scope of patent protection
by drafting claims (as long as they are valid) that cover the range of
devices, materials or processes that would infringe the patent.
Using claims to define the scope of patent protection provides
greater certainty to a patentee, because the patentee does not have to
rely on the court that will eventually try the infringement action to
determine which variations of the invention described in the patent
are entitled to patent protection. The use of claims permits examina-
tion by the Patent Office and once the patent issues, each of the claims
is clothed with a presumption of validity. 32 Finally, the claims pro-
vide notice to the public of the scope of the patent so that competitors
can determine what devices, materials or processes would infringe
and make their plans and investments accordingly. 33
As patent claims practice shifted to the peripheral definition sys-
tem and the significance of claims in defining the scope of patent pro-
tection increased, issues concerning the permissible scope of claims
arose. In O'Reilly v. Morse,34 the Supreme Court decided that a claim
by the inventor of the telegraph was invalid because it was too broad.
The inventor, Samuel Morse, claimed not only the specific machinery
described in the written description of the invention, but also the use
of "electro-magnetism, however developed for marking or printing in-
telligible characters, signs, or letters at any distances . . . ."35 The
Supreme Court ruled the claim was overbroad, because Morse had
claimed "an exclusive right to use a manner and process which he has
not described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not
describe when he obtained his patent."36 In other words, while Morse
was entitled to a patent for the telegraph, the claims could not extend
to other inventions that Morse had not created which might have fea-
tures in common with a telegraph.
The Supreme Court also addressed the permissible scope of claims
in Consolidated Electric Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co. (The In-
candescent Lamp Patent).37 The patentees developed an incandescent
31. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d) ("Every order granting an injunction... shall be specific
in terms .... ).
32. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000). Clear and convincing evidence is required to overcome
the presumption of validity. E.g., Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device Alliance, Inc.,
244 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d
1308, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
33. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731
(2002) ("[Tlhe public .. .should be encouraged to pursue inventions, creations,
and new ideas beyond the inventor's exclusive rights.").
34. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
35. Id. at 112.
36. Id. at 113.
37. 159 U.S. 465 (1895).
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lamp that used carbonized paper as a filament, and they obtained a
patent that included both a narrow claim for a filament of carbonized
paper and a broad claim for a filament of "carbonized fibrous or textile
material."38 Thomas Edison produced a competing incandescent lamp
with a filament fabricated from a particular type of bamboo, which he
discovered worked better than other materials. The Supreme Court
decided that the broad claim for filaments of any fibrous or textile
materials was invalid, because the patentees had not shown that
every fibrous or textile material was suitable for use as a filament for
an incandescent lamp. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme
Court emphasized the statutory requirement that the patent applica-
tion must include a written description that would enable a person
skilled in the art or science to which it pertains to make and use the
invention. 39 The Court held: "If the description be so vague and un-
certain that no one can tell, except by independent experiments, how
to construct the patented device, the patent is void."40 Since Edison's
discovery of the superior properties of bamboo as a material for fila-
ments had required extensive investigation, the patentees' broad
claim to the use of any fibrous or textile material for a filament of an
incandescent lamp was not supported by the written description in
their patent application.41
The permissible scope of a patent's claims continues to be confined
to the range of variations of the invention that the written description
enables a person skilled in the inventor's field to produce. 42 For exam-
ple, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held in Amgen, Inc. v.
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. ,43 that "the scope of the claims must bear
a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement provided by the
specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art."4 4 Thus, under the
38. Id. at 468.
39. The requirement that the written description in a patent application must enable
any person skilled in the art to make and use the invention is codified at 35
U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
40. Consol. Electric Light Co., 159 U.S. at 474.
41. See id. at 475-76.
42. In addition, the written description must "describe the claimed invention so that
one skilled in the art can recognize what is claimed." Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-
Probe Inc., 296 F.3d 1316, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc); see also Crown Opera-
tions Int'l v. Solutia Inc., 289 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[Tlhe disclosure
must convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that the inventor
was in possession of the invention.").
43. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
44. Id. at 1214 (quoting Application of Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970)); see
also AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[A]s part of
the quid pro quo of the patent bargain, the applicant's specification must enable
one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the full scope of the claimed inven-
tion."); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(finding claims invalid for lack of enablement); In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496
(Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[T]here must be sufficient disclosure, either through illustra-
[Vol. 84:11131120
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peripheral definition system, a patentee is permitted claims that en-
compass any variations of the invention that would be apparent to a
reasonably skilled person in the inventor's field as long as the claims
do not intrude on the prior art.
III. A VESTIGE OF THE CENTRAL DEFINITION SYSTEM IN
35 U.S.C. § 112 1 6
While the scope of patent protection today for the most part is de-
termined by the peripheral definition system, a vestige of the central
definition system for some claims can still be found in section 112 of
title 35 of the United States Code. Paragraph 6 of this section
provides:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or
step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, mate-
rial, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof.
4 5
Under this provision, the scope of patent protection for a combination
claim is determined by a central definition system, rather than a pe-
ripheral definition system, but only if the claim is expressed as a
means or step for performing a specified function.
Paragraph 6 was added to section 112 in 1952 to legislatively over-
rule the Supreme Court's decision in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing
Co. v. Walker.46 In the Halliburton case, the Supreme Court held that
claims expressed as means for performing a specified function violated
the requirement that the inventor "particularly point out and dis-
tinctly claim" the invention.4 7 The Court decided that these claims
"failed adequately to depict the structure, mode, and operation" of the
invention, because they described elements of the invention in terms
of what they did instead of in terms of their own physical
characteristics.48
Paragraph 6 of section 112 addresses the Halliburton Court's con-
cern with the lack of specificity of claims expressed as means for per-
forming a specified function by providing that the functional language
would be construed to cover the particular structure that is described
tive examples or terminology, to teach those of ordinary skill how to make and
how to use the invention as broadly as it is claimed."); United States v. Telectron-
ics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 786 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding scope of claims satisfied stan-
dard for enablement). See generally JEFFREY G. SHELDON, HOW TO WRITE A
PATENT APPLICATION § 7.3 (1992 & Supp. 2002) (discussing the relationship of the
enablement requirement to the scope of claims).
45. 35 U.S.C. § 112(6) (2000).
46. 329 U.S. 1 (1946); see Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
17, 27 (1997) ("Congress enacted § 112, 6 in response to [Halliburton].").
47. Id. at 9-10.
48. Id. at 8.
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in the specification. 49 Thus, the statute incorporates the description of
the particular structure from the specification into the claim so that
the claim itself does not need to include the description, and the func-
tional language serves as a shorthand reference to what may be a
lengthy detailed description. In addition, paragraph 6 provides that
the claim covers not only the particular structure in the written
description, but also "equivalents thereof." In a throwback to the cen-
tral definition system, the scope of patent protection for functional
claims extends to the particular structure described in the specifica-
tion and to what the court determines are equivalent structures that
perform the function specified in the claims. As is the case with other
claims, the scope of functional claims under section 112, paragraph 6
is limited by what would be apparent to a reasonably skilled person in
the inventor's field at the time the patent is issued.50
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
The doctrine of equivalents extends the scope of patent protection
beyond the literal language of the claims to cover insubstantial varia-
tions that would otherwise not be infringing.5 1 The doctrine has been
applied by the Supreme Court in four cases, which are discussed
below.
A. Winans v. Demead
The Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of equivalents in
Winans v. Denmead.52 The plaintiff in Winans obtained a patent in
1847 for an improved railroad car for transporting coal that had a cir-
cular-bottomed, rather than a flat-bottomed, cargo bed. The specifica-
tion included the following language: "What I claim as my invention
... is making the body of a car for the transportation of coal, &c., in
the form of a frustum of a cone, substantially as herein described,
whereby the force exerted by the weight of the load presses equally in
all directions . . . ."53 The defendants made similar railroad cars that
had an octagonal cargo bed, and there was evidence offered at trial
that the defendants' octagonal cars were substantially the same as the
plaintiffs circular cars. The trial judge ruled that the defendants did
49. See Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Caterpillar Inc. v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
50. See Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[A]
structural equivalent under § 112 must have been available at the time of the
issuance of the claim.").
51. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 727
(2002) ("[A] patent protects its holder against efforts of copyists to evade liability
for infringement by making only insubstantial changes to a patented invention.").
52. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1854).
53. Id. at 342.
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not infringe the patent, because the defendants' cars were rectilinear,
while the patent was for a conical shape. The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that whether there was infringement or not depended
on whether the octagonal shape was "so near to a true circle as sub-
stantially to embody the patentee's mode of operation, and thereby at-
tain the same kind of result as was reached by his invention."54 It,
therefore, remanded the case for the jury to resolve the issue.
The Supreme Court's adoption of the doctrine of equivalents in Wi-
nans is easily understood in its historical context. A modern patent
attorney operating under the peripheral definition system would have
drafted perhaps a dozen claims to protect the invention by staking out
numerous variations of the shape of the cargo bed-such as hexago-
nal, heptagonal, octagonal, nonagonal, and other polygonal shapes, as
well as elliptical shapes and any other shapes that would be reasona-
bly apparent to a person of reasonable skill in the inventor's field.
Moreover, a modern patent attorney would have described the shape
as "substantially in the form of a frustum of a cone" to expressly cover
minor variations from the precise mathematical shape. 55 At the time
of the Winans decision, however, claims were not required in patents,
and even though the Winans patent had claim language, claims were
generally not determinative of the issue of infringement prior to
1870.56
Under the central definition system that prevailed when Winans
was decided, a doctrine of equivalents was necessary so that the scope
of patent protection would not be limited to the particular embodi-
ment in the written description. Nevertheless, the doctrine of
equivalents has survived the evolution from the central definition sys-
tem to the modern peripheral definition system.
B. Graver Tank
Nearly one hundred years after Winans, the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the doctrine of equivalents in Graver Tank & Manufacturing
Co. v. Linde Air Products Co. 57 The patent was for an electric welding
54. Id. at 344.
55. "Substantially" is commonly used in claims and is permitted if it serves to reason-
ably describe the invention to a person skilled in the field of the invention. E.g.,
Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc., 264 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001). It should
be noted that the claim in Winans did include the boilerplate language "substan-
tially as hereinafter described." This language merely incorporated the specifica-
tion into the claim, and did not expand the claim to cover shapes other than a
frustum of a cone. The language "substantially as described" was construed by
later courts to have no legal effect. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying
text.
56. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
57. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
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process, and it included claims for various welding fluxes 58 used in the
process. 59 The issue presented to the Court was whether the defen-
dant's flux, which contained manganese silicate, infringed the claims
in the plaintiffs patent for a flux containing alkaline earth metal sili-
cates.6 0 In a prior opinion, 6 1 the Supreme Court had upheld the dis-
trict court's determination that two claims for fluxes containing
metallic silicates or, more broadly, silicates were invalid because they
were too broad and beyond the scope of the patentee's invention, since
there are many metallic silicates that are not effective as fluxes.6 2 On
a rehearing that was limited to four narrower claims for fluxes con-
taining alkaline earth metal silicates that the trial court had ruled
were valid, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision that
the defendant's flux infringed the narrower claims, even though man-
ganese is not an alkaline earth metal. 6 3 The Court noted that there
was expert testimony in the record that manganese and magnesium
(which is an alkaline earth metal) had similar properties, and experts
in the field understood that manganese could be substituted for mag-
nesium in the flux.64 In addition, the trial court had noted that the
patent specification had referred to the use of manganese silicate in
fluxes. 65 While the Supreme Court acknowledged that there was no
literal infringement, it ruled that the claims of the patent were in-
fringed under the doctrine of equivalents. 66
Assuming that the other requirements for a patent were satis-
fied,67 the expert testimony and the patent specification would clearly
have supported a claim for a flux containing manganese silicate.68 In
the Graver Tank case, the Supreme Court did not simply allow the
patentee to assert a claim for a flux containing manganese silicate,
however; instead, the Court ruled that the patent covered a flux con-
taining manganese silicate in the absence of an explicit claim for it.
Comparing the piracy of an invention to the piracy of a copyrighted
book or play, the Court explained that a doctrine of equivalents was
58. A flux promotes the fusion of metal during welding by preventing the formation
of oxides.
59. The background of the case is described in Paul M. Janicke, Heat of Passion:
What Really Happened in Graver Tank, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (1996).
60. Manganese is not an alkaline earth metal.
61. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271 (1949).
62. Id. at 276-77 (referring to Linde Air Prods. Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 86 F.
Supp. 191 (N.D. Ind. 1947)).
63. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
64. Id. at 610-12.
65. Linde Air Prods., 86 F. Supp. at 199.
66. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 612.
67. The dissent by Justice Douglas states that the claim for manganese silicate was
unpatentable, because it was covered by other patents that had expired. Id. at
618 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
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needed because patents would have little value if a competitor could
pirate an invention by copying it with insubstantial changes to avoid
infringement. 69 There is a fundamental difference, however, between
the infringement of copyrighted materials and a patented invention,
because there are no claims for copyrighted works. Consequently,
substantial similarity between the copyrighted and infringing works
is sufficient for a claim of copyright infringement.70 While the Court's
concern would be warranted under a central definition system, there
is no (or at least considerably less) justification for a doctrine of
equivalents under a peripheral definition system, where the patent
attorney drafting the claims may protect against piracy by making the
claims broad enough to cover insubstantial changes as well as any
other variations of the invention that would be apparent to a person of
reasonable skill in the inventor's field.
Quoting from an earlier case, the Supreme Court declared that a
patentee may invoke the doctrine of equivalents against an accused
infringer who makes a product that "performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result."7 1
The defendant's use of manganese silicate for a welding flux clearly
performed the same function (i.e., preventing the formation of oxides)
to obtain the same result (i.e., the welding of metal) as. the fluxes
made of alkaline earth metal silicate in the claims. Any welding flux
would. 72 But the defendant's product performed the same function to
obtain the same result using manganese silicate, instead of an alka-
line earth metal silicate. Is this "substantially the same way" to per-
form the same function to obtain the same result? If so, how does
manganese silicate differ from any other substance that is used as a
welding flux? Would the doctrine of equivalents extend to any sub-
stance that was used as a welding flux, or is it limited to manganese
silicate in some way?
The triple identity test (same function, same way, same result)
used by the Court is generally inapposite to inventions that are char-
acterized by their structure (such as machines, products, and composi-
69. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607-08.
70. See, e.g., Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[Pllaintiff may
establish copying by showing that defendant had access to plaintiff's work and
that the two works are 'substantially similar' in idea and in expression of the
idea."); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936)
(Hand, J.) ("[I]t is enough [for copyright infringement] that substantial parts
were lifted .... ).
71. Graver Tank, 339 U.S at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280
U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
72. Similarly, Thomas Edison's bamboo filament for an incandescent lamp performed
the same function to obtain the same result as the patentees' carbonized paper
filament. But the Supreme Court refused to allow the patentees to extend the
scope of patent protection beyond carbonized paper. See Consol. Elec. Light Co. v.
McKeesport Light Co. (The Incandescent Lamp Patent), 159 U.S. 465 (1895).
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tions),73 as opposed to processes. 74 Claims to machines, products and
compositions are defined by their physical characteristics, rather than
their functions. 75 Thus, a claim for a machine, product, or composi-
tion will be infringed if another person makes or sells it, regardless of
its function. 76 Moreover, different objects may be used to perform the
same function in the same way to obtain the same result-just be-
cause a screwdriver can be used as a toothpick does not mean that a
screwdriver and a toothpick are equivalents. Since the claims at issue
in Graver Tank were for welding flux products, the triple identity test
should not have been applied to them.
The Court noted that an important factor in determining equiva-
lence was whether persons having reasonable skill in the inventor's
field would have known that an ingredient not contained in a patent
(e.g., manganese) was interchangeable with one that was (e.g., an al-
kaline earth metal).77 This factor appears to be the same as the stan-
dard used for the permissible scope of the claims since both refer to
the hypothetical person of reasonable skill in the inventor's field. To
the extent it is employed, this factor would eliminate the need for
drafting claims, since claims would no longer be needed to define the
scope of patent protection. Instead, a patent would need to set out
only a written description, and the courts would be required to deter-
mine the scope of patent protection based on the range of equivalents
that would be familiar to a person of reasonable skill in the inventor's
field. Claims are required, though, and they are better suited for de-
fining the scope of patent protection than the doctrine of equivalents.
In the course of its decision, the Supreme Court emphasized that
the differences between the claims and the infringing product must be
73. Patents may be obtained for "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter . . . ." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
74. Cf Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39-40 (1997)
("There seems to be substantial agreement that, while the triple identity test may
be suitable for analyzing mechanical devices, it often provides a poor framework
for analyzing other products or processes.").
75. See Int'l Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1546 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (Lourie, J., dissenting) ("Except for process inventions, which perforce must
be defined by their component procedural steps, inventions are generally defined
by structure, i.e., by what they are, rather than what they do."), rev'd, Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
76. In some cases, a claim for a product may be defined by the process by which it is
made; if so, there will be no infringement if that product is made by a different
process. See Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 846-47 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
77. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950) ("An
important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have
known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with
one that was.").
1126 [Vol. 84:1113
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
insubstantial.78 A major difficulty with applying this substantiality
standard is that it tends to be circular, because any change that
avoids a claim of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is
substantial as far as a competitor's liability is concerned. Just as com-
petitors should be discouraged from infringing valid patent claims,
they should be encouraged to compete by designing their products so
that they do not infringe, and to do so, competitors need to be able to
tell whether the differences between their products and the claims are
sufficient to not infringe.79
Justice Douglas noted in a brief dissent that the doctrine of
equivalents was especially inappropriate in the Graver Tank case be-
cause the use of manganese silicate as a welding flux had already been
disclosed in previous patents, and therefore, if a claim for a welding
flux had been included, it would have been invalid.80 Justice Douglas
concluded: "Thus we end with a strange anomaly: a monopoly is ob-
tained on an unpatented and unpatentable article."8 1
78. Id. at 610.
79. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732
(2002) ("If competitors cannot be certain about a patent's extent, they may be
deterred from engaging in legitimate manufactures outside its limits, or they
may invest by mistake in competing products that the patent secures.").
80. A claim for a flux containing manganese silicate would have been anticipated by
U.S. Patent No. 1,754,566 (issued Apr. 15, 1930). Janicke, supra note 59, at
120-21, 126. The majority opinion noted that this patent "taught the use of man-
ganese silicate in welding fluxes." Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 611. Justice Black's
dissent suggested that the patentee's failure to include a claim for a flux contain-
ing manganese silicate was deliberate. See id. at 616 (Black, J., dissenting). Pro-
fessor Janicke has found no support for this accusation in the historical record,
however. See Janicke, supra note 59, at 125-26.
Professor Chisum has suggested that the reason the patentee did not include
a claim for magnesium silicate was that when the Graver Tank patent was issued
in 1935, the Patent Office restricted the number of specific (or species) claims for
alternative embodiments of an invention. 5A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PAT-
ENTS § 18.0212] (2005). Rule 41 of the Rules of Practice in the United States Pat-
ent Office allowed an application to include only three species claims if it also
included a generic (or genus) claim that covered all the species. 37 C.F.R. § 1.41
(1939) ("[M]ore than one species of an invention, not to exceed three, may be
claimed in one application if that application also includes an allowable claim
generic to all the claimed species .... "); see also Leon Chasan, Graver v. Linde-
A Valid Patent, 32 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 285, 296 (1950) (discussing the Patent Of-
fice Rule). The patent had twenty-nine claims, eleven of which were for composi-
tions, however. See U.S. Patent No. 2,043,960 (issued June 9, 1936).
Accordingly, it is difficult to see why one of the claims could not have been modi-
fied to cover magnesium silicate, or a claim for magnesium silicate could not have
been added to the twenty-nine claims that were already in the patent; see also
Janicke, supra note 59, at 120 n.443 (suggesting that the rules did not preclude
patentee from filing claims for each of the nine silicates in the specification).
81. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 618 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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C. Warner-Jenkinson
The next case in which the Supreme Court examined the doctrine
of equivalents was Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical
Co.,82 which was decided fifty years after Graver Tank. The plaintiffs
patent was for a process for removing impurities from dyes used for
food coloring. The process involved subjecting a fluid containing the
dye to ultrafiltration through a membrane at a specified pressure and
"at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0."83 The defendant developed a
process that differed from the plaintiffs process only in that it oper-
ated at a pH of 5.0. At trial, the plaintiff conceded that there was no
literal infringement of the patent (because a pH of 5.0 was outside the
range of approximately 6.0 to 9.0), but the jury nevertheless found in-
fringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
On certiorari, the defendant marshaled four arguments for over-
turning the doctrine of equivalents. First, the doctrine is inconsistent
with the requirement for a patentee to claim the invention the patent
covers. Second, the doctrine circumvents the reissue process and
avoids its limitations. Third, the doctrine is inconsistent with the role
of the Patent and Trademark Office in setting the scope of the patent
during the process of issuing the patent. And fourth, the doctrine has
implicitly been rejected by the legislative adoption of the provision in
section 112, paragraph 6, for expressing a claim as a means or step for
performing a specified function. The Supreme Court brushed aside
the first three arguments, saying that it had rejected them fifty years
earlier in Graver Tank.8 4 It then rejected the fourth argument, saying
that section 112, paragraph 6, "was enacted as a targeted cure to [the]
specific problem" 85 created by Halliburton, which had rejected claims
that were expressed as a means or step for performing a specified
function.86 The Court reasoned that it would be quite a stretch to find
legislative intent for a broad overruling of the doctrine of equivalents
on the basis of the enactment of such a narrow statutory provision.
Thus, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine of equivalents.87
The Court saw a need, however, for limiting the doctrine of
equivalents in order to reduce its conflict with the benefits provided by
the claims in defining the scope of patent protection and giving notice
of the scope to the public. Adopting the reasoning of Judge Nies of the
82. 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
83. Id. at 22. "pH" is a measure of the degree of acidity or alkalinity of a fluid. It
ranges from 0.0 to 14.0 with lower numbers for increasing acidity, higher num-
bers for increasing alkalinity, and 7.0 for a neutral solution.
84. Id. at 25-27.
85. Id. at 28.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
87. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40 ("Today we adhere to the doctrine of
equivalents.").
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United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the Supreme
Court decided that while the doctrine of equivalents might modify an
element of a claim, it could not eliminate an element entirely. The
Court stated:
Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the
scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents must be
applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole. It
is important to ensure that the application of the doctrine, even as to an indi-
vidual element, is not allowed such broad play as to effectively eliminate that
element in its entirety.8 8
A potential problem with applying this "All Elements"8 9 rule is de-
termining what is an element. For example, is the pH range from ap-
proximately 6.0 to 9.0 an element or part of an element? 90 There is no
statutory definition of what constitutes an element of a claim, but the
Federal Circuit has defined it as a limitation in a claim.9 1
Whether a particular feature of a claim is an "element" for pur-
poses of the doctrine of equivalents might depend on how the claim
was drafted, rather than on its substance. Professor Adelman gives
the example of a claim for a fork with four tines.9 2 Would a claim for
the fork with a first tine, a second tine, a third tine, and a fourth tine
have four elements-one for each tine? If so, then under the "All Ele-
ments" rule, the doctrine of equivalents could not cover a fork with
three tines, because this would completely eliminate the element of
the fourth tine. But if the claim was drafted as a fork with four tines
(rather than being broken down into four separate elements), then the
doctrine of equivalents could cover a fork with only three tines without
violating the "All Elements" rule, because the number of tines would
be a single element that could be modified without being completely
88. Id. at 29.
89. See, e.g., Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 149 F.3d 1309, 1316
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (referring to this requirement as the "All Elements" rule).
90. On remand, the Federal Circuit appears to have determined that the range was
only part of an element, because it decided that in the particular context of the
case a pH of 5.0 was equivalent to a pH of approximately 6.0, as long as prosecu-
tion history estoppel, see infra text accompanying notes 93-95, did not bar the
patentee from invoking the doctrine of equivalents. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v.
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (en banc). Professor
Chisum observes, however, that "the Supreme Court implicitly treated the lower
end of the pH range as an element, because the Court remanded for a determina-
tion whether that element had been vitiated by the finding that 5.0 was
equivalent to approximately 6.0 to 9.0 pH." Donald S. Chisum, The Scope of Pro-
tection for Patents After the Supreme Court's Warner-Jenkinson Decision: The
Fair Protection-Certainty Conundrum, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 1, 32 (1998).
91. See Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259
(Fed. Cir. 1989) ("In the All Elements rule, 'element' is used in the sense of a
limitation of a claim.").
92. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAw 806 (2d ed.
2003).
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eliminated. If the "All Elements" rule would indeed make a distinc-
tion between these two formats of a claim for a fork, it would not ap-
pear to serve any rational purpose.
After rejecting the defendant's arguments for overturning the doc-
trine of equivalents, the Court then addressed three possible restric-
tions on its application advanced by the defendant. These were: (1)
prosecution history estoppel; (2) a requirement for wrongful intent;
and (3) a requirement that the equivalents were disclosed in the pat-
ent itself.
The Supreme Court had previously recognized the doctrine of pros-
ecution history estoppel9 3 as a limitation on the doctrine of
equivalents. 94 Prosecution history estoppel bars a patentee from re-
capturing subject matter that the patentee had surrendered during
prosecution (i.e., the course of applying for a patent).95 The defendant
argued that because the patentee had added the phrase "at a pH from
approximately 6.0 to 9.0" to the claim by amendment during prosecu-
tion, the patentee was barred from extending the scope of patent pro-
tection under the doctrine of equivalents to cover a pH of 5.0.
Upholding the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, the Court nev-
ertheless ruled that the application of prosecution history estoppel
was limited by the reason for the amendment. The Court noted that
in all of its prior cases applying prosecution history estoppel, the
amendments had been made to avoid intruding on prior art or to ad-
dress a specific concern related to patentability. The Court stated that
in some cases an amendment might have been requested by the Pat-
ent and Trademark Office without an intent to limit the doctrine of
equivalents, or even with the expectation that a range of equivalents
would be allowed. It concluded that an amendment would not neces-
93. Prosecution history estoppel is also known as file wrapper estoppel. Warner-Jen-
kinson, 520 U.S. at 30.
94. See, e.g., Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136 (1942)
("[R]ecourse may not be had to [the doctrine of equivalents) to recapture claims
which the patentee has surrendered by amendment.").
95. There are two types of prosecution history estoppel: amendment-based estoppel
and argument-based estoppel. See Deering Precision Instruments L.L.C. v. Vec-
tor Distribution Sys., Inc., 347 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Eagle Comtron-
ics, Inc. v. Arrow Comm'n Labs, Inc., 305 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Amendment-based estoppel arises from the surrender of subject matter by means
of amending a claim; it is the more common type and was involved in the Warner-
Jenkinson case. Argument-based estoppel arises from statements made during
prosecution if they show a clear intent to surrender the subject matter. Deering
Precision, 347 F.3d at 1326; Eagle Comtronics, 305 F.3d at 1316; see also Desper
Prods., Inc. v. Qsound Labs, Inc., 157 F.3d 1325, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Unequiv-
ocal assertions or arguments made during prosecution may also create an estop-
pel."). In addition, there is a related doctrine called prosecution disclaimer which
precludes "patentees from recapturing through claim interpretation specific
meanings disclaimed during prosecution." Omega Eng'g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp.,
334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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sarily preclude the patentee from relying on the doctrine of
equivalents if the reason for the amendment was not related to
patentability. 96
Unfortunately, in the case before the Court, there was no indica-
tion in the record of the reason for the amendment adding the lower
limit for the pH of approximately 6.0. 9 7 Accordingly, the Court re-
manded the case to the Federal Circuit to determine the reason for the
amendment. 98 The Court also directed the lower courts to presume
that an amendment was made for a purpose related to patentability
(so that the patentee would be barred by prosecution history estoppel
from invoking the doctrine of equivalents) in the absence of evidence
that the amendment was made for another purpose.
It is difficult to understand why the reason for the amendment
should matter. After all, the patentee in the Warner-Jenkinson case
had expressly restricted its claims to "a pH from approximately 6.0 to
9.0." It should not matter whether the patentee disclaimed pH levels
below 6.0 for the selfish purpose of convincing the Patent and Trade-
mark Office ("PTO") to issue a patent, the altruistic purpose of dedi-
cating a portion of the invention to the public, or even because the
patent attorney was careless. In addition, what is meant by the re-
quirement that the amendment was not related to patentability? The
Court said that the United States had informed it in its amicus curiae
brief that there were "a variety of reasons why the PTO may request a
change in claim language."9 9 However, the amicus curiae brief did not
give any reasons that were unrelated to patentability. Instead, the
brief gave only two reasons to make amendments besides avoiding
prior art: to reflect the scope of what is enabled and to add specificity
to the claims.10 0 In a later case, the Court explicitly ruled that prose-
cution history estoppel applies not only to amendments made to avoid
96. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33, 40-41.
97. The record was clear that the reason for including the upper limit for the pH of
9.0 was to avoid a prior patent, but the parties disagreed about the reason for
including the lower limit. Id. at 22. The written description of the invention in
the patent states "it is preferred to adjust the pH to approximately 6.0 to 8.0
before passage through the ultrafiltration membrane." U.S. Patent No. 4,560,746
at col.7 1.59-61 (issued Dec. 24, 1985). Professor Chisum has suggested that "the
claim amendment may have resulted from a compromise between an attorney
and examiner, each of whom may have only imperfectly understood the nature of
the invention disclosed in the specification and its relationship to the prior art."
Chisum, supra note 90, at 18 n.82.
98. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 34. The Federal Circuit in turn remanded the
case to the trial court to conduct an inquiry into the reason for the amendment.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (en banc). See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
99. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 31.
100. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22-23, Warner-Jenkinson, 520
U.S. 17 (No. 95-728), 1996 WL 172221.
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prior art but also to amendments that narrow a patent's scope for
other reasons related to patentability, such as to reflect the scope of
what is enabled or to add specificity.lOl
The Supreme Court's discussion of prosecution history estoppel is
especially significant, because the claims for the vast majority of pat-
ents are amended during patent prosecution. While an applicant for a
patent is charged with constructive knowledge of all patents and other
publications that predate the invention,1O2 a patent attorney's actual
knowledge is more limited. A patent attorney's objective is to draft
claims as broadly as the prior art known to the patent attorney will
permit.1 0 3 The patent examiner's role in the patent prosecution pro-
cess is to provide an independent perspective with respect to the prior
art. Although the patent examiner may lack the resources or incen-
tive to uncover prior art that a real adversary may have, 104 the exam-
iner conducts an independent search of the patents and publications
in the inventor's field, and much of the time, the examiner does find
some additional prior art that relates to at least some portion of the
original claims. To obtain issuance of the patent, the patent attorney
will then be required to narrow the claims by amendment in order to
avoid the prior art so that the patent may be issued. Because amend-
ments are required for most patents, prosecution history estoppel is a
significant limitation on the doctrine of equivalents.
Next, the Warner-Jenkinson Court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment to restrict the doctrine of equivalents by requiring a showing of
an intent to copy or pirate the invention. In arguing for an intent re-
quirement, the defendant relied on references in Graver Tank to "the
unscrupulous copyist" and "piracy." The Court ruled, though, that
Graver Tank did not require the doctrine of equivalents to be limited
to instances where the accused infringer copied the invention. The
Court emphasized the practical difficulty of distinguishing between an
intentional copyist and an incremental innovator who was designing
around the claims, and it indicated a preference for more objective
principles to determine infringement. The Court pointed to the
"known interchangeability of substitutes for an element of a pat-
101. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736-37
(2002).
102. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("[Oince an invention is in the
public domain, it is no longer patentable by anyone.").
103. The patent attorney has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the pat-
ent examiner and is required to disclose all information known by the attorney to
be material to patentability. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2005).
104. The Patent and Trademark Office is often criticized for issuing invalid patents.
See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1495, 1495-96 (2001). Forty-six percent of the issued patents that are tested in
court are declared invalid. Id. at 1500.
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ent"10 5 as one of the objective factors noted in Graver Tank for decid-
ing whether the patented invention and the accused device were
substantially the same. The Court concluded: "intent plays no role in
the application of the doctrine of equivalents."1O6
The defendant's last argument was that the doctrine of equivalents
should be limited to what was disclosed in the patent itself in order to
minimize conflict with the notice function of patent claims.1O7 The
equivalent (manganese silicate) that was involved in Graver Tank, for
example, had been disclosed in the patent.1 0 8 Instead of simply re-
jecting this argument, though, the Court declared that not only did
the equivalents not have to be disclosed in the patent, they did not
have to have been known to the patentee or anybody else at the time
the patent was issued. Although the Court recognized that the doc-
trine of equivalents was limited by the knowledge of a skilled practi-
tioner, it ruled that the proper time for evaluating equivalency was
the time of infringement, rather than the time of issuance of the pat-
ent. The Court concluded that if the equivalents did not need to be
known at the time the patent issued, then, a fortiori, these equivalents
would not have to be disclosed in the patent.
The Court failed to provide an explanation for its conclusion. It
simply stated: "Insofar as the question under the doctrine of
equivalents is whether an accused element is equivalent to a claimed
element, the proper time for evaluating equivalency-and thus knowl-
edge of interchangeability between elements-is at the time of in-
fringement, not at the time the patent was issued." 10 9 The rationale
for this conclusion may have been that while literal infringement is
determined by the literal meaning of the claims as of the time of issu-
ance of the patent, infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is
determined by the accused infringer's actions and whether there were
"insubstantial differences" between the patented invention and ac-
cused device.11o
As a result of the Court's ruling, the scope of patent protection
under the doctrine of equivalents will expand continually as more
knowledge is acquired over time. Not only is the scope of patent pro-
tection freed from the limitations of what the patentee did claim, it is
105. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 36.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 37.
108. See supra text accompanying note 65.
109. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 37.
110. See also Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1528
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) ("Limiting the range of potentially infringing substitu-
tions to those known at the time of the patent's issuance would undermine the
doctrine [of equivalents], denying patent owners protection of the substance of
their inventions against new forms of infringement."), rev'd on other grounds,
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
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freed from the limits of what the patentee could have claimed. Thus,
under the Warner-Jenkinson decision, the doctrine of equivalents ex-
tends patent protection to after-arising equivalents, that is, variations
of an invention that were not known at the time of the issuance of the
patent but would be considered equivalents from the perspective of a
skilled practitioner at the time of infringement.
The Supreme Court also mentioned, but did not resolve, the ques-
tion of whether the doctrine of equivalents was an issue for the judge
or the jury. The Court had previously decided that the construction of
patent claims was exclusively within the province of the court,"' thus
facilitating the use of summary judgment to resolve whether there
was literal infringement of the claims. The Federal Circuit held in the
en banc decision below that infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents was a jury issue. 112 Although the jury trial issue had
been discussed extensively by the plaintiff and amici curiae on certio-
rari, and by the Federal Circuit, the defendant made only a passing
reference to the issue in its briefs (possibly because the defendant was
making so many other arguments on the merits), and so, the Court
declined to decide the matter.
By not deciding the jury trial issue, the Court permitted the Fed-
eral Circuit's ruling to stand. Requiring a jury to decide whether
there is infringement under the doctrine of equivalents allows a pat-
entee whose claim for literal infringement has been rejected by the
trial court on summary judgment to nevertheless reach the jury. Not
only is a jury trial more expensive than a disposition by the judge,
either by summary judgment or after a bench trial, but the outcome is
likely to be hard to predict in many cases. Where the technology is
complex and the patent claims are convoluted, the jury may have
great difficulty understanding even the literal scope of the claims.
The jury's difficulty in understanding the technology is compounded
by the confused state of the law with respect to the doctrine of
equivalents and having to decide the factual question of whether the
defendant's product is equivalent to the claimed invention. Since the
judge is more likely than the jury to understand both the meaning of
the patent claims1 3 and the law with respect to the doctrine of
equivalents, a judge's decision is likely to be more predictable than a
jury's.
The Supreme Court also took time to discuss the appropriate stan-
dard for deciding whether there is infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.1 4 It noted that the parties and the Federal Circuit were
111. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
112. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1522.
113. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388 ("[Jludges, not juries, are the better suited to find the
acquired meaning of patent terms.").
114. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39-40.
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divided on whether the triple identity test (same function, same way,
same result) or the insubstantial differences test-both of which were
taken from Graver Tank-was better.lls The Court found fault with
both formulations; it observed that there was substantial agreement
that the triple identity test was not suitable for inventions other than
mechanical devices, while the insubstantial differences test did not of-
fer much guidance as to what was "insubstantial."1 16 It then finessed
the question by stating that it was less important which particular
linguistic framework was used than that the courts follow the "All Ele-
ments" rule.1 17 Rather than micromanage the Federal Circuit as to
its formulation of the doctrine of equivalents, the Court said that it
expected the Federal Circuit to refine the formulation of the test for
equivalence through the Federal Circuit's case law.1ls Despite the
Supreme Court's criticism of the triple identity and insubstantial dif-
ferences tests for equivalence, however, the Federal Circuit continues
to apply them without any further refinement. 1 19
On remand, the Federal Circuit found substantial support in the
record for the jury's verdict of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. It noted particularly the testimony of one of the inven-
tors that the patented process would work for pH values as low as
2.0.120 It also ruled that the jury's finding of equivalence for a pH of
5.0 did not entirely eliminate the claim element of a pH of approxi-
mately 6.0 under the "All Elements" rule.12 1 The Federal Circuit also
decided, however, to remand the case to the trial court for a determi-
nation of the reason why the limitation of a pH of approximately 6.0
was added to the claims.12 2 Thus, even though the patentee had ex-
pressly limited the claims to a pH of approximately 6.0, the scope of
patent protection could nevertheless possibly extend to a pH of 5.0 (or
perhaps even 2.0), if the patentee could show that the reason for in-
cluding this limitation in the claims was not related to patentability.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 40.
118. Id. at 39-40.
119. See, e.g., Searfoss v. Pioneer Consol. Corp., 374 F.3d 1142, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("In determining whether the differences between the accused product and the
claim limitation are 'insubstantial,' it is axiomatic that we may determine
whether the accused product performs the same function, in the same way with
the same result.").
120. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (en banc). Lemon juice is an example of a fluid with a pH of 2.0.
121. Id.
122. After the case was fully briefed in the trial court, the parties settled the case just
before the trial court handed down a decision. E-mail from David E. Schmit,
Counsel for Hilton Davis Chem. Co., to Charles W. Adams, Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Tulsa College of Law (Aug. 3, 2004, 12:16:44 CST) (on file with the
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW).
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D. Festo
The most recent Supreme Court case concerning the doctrine of
equivalents is Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co.123 While the Festo decision once again reaffirmed the doctrine of
equivalents, it drastically narrowed its scope in cases where a patent's
claims are amended during prosecution. Moreover, some of the lan-
guage in Festo raises the possibility that the drastically narrowed
scope of the doctrine may be extended to cases where there were no
amendments to the claims.
The Festo case was concerned with two patents (the Carroll patent
and the Stoll patent), for complicated mechanical devices called mag-
netically coupled rodless cylinders. A conventional cylinder has a pis-
ton that moves up and down inside the cylinder with a rod attached to
the piston that protrudes outside the cylinder during part of the
stroke. A rodless cylinder has the advantage that it takes up less
space than a conventional cylinder because the stroke of the cylinder
is contained within the length of the unit.
Although there was no literal infringement of either patent, the
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the patentee for in-
fringement of the Carroll patent under the doctrine of equivalents,
and a jury found infringement of the Stoll patent under the doctrine of
equivalents.124 The defendant conceded that its device literally in-
fringed all but one of the elements of claim 9 of the Carroll patent.
This element was described as a "pair of resilient sealing rings" at
opposite ends of a part of the piston that created a fluid-tight seal in
order to hold pressure fluid within the cylinder. The defendant's de-
vice used a single two-way seal at the end of the piston that contacted
the pressure fluid to create the fluid-tight seal with the cylinder, in-
stead of a pair of one-way sealing rings. 12 5 The defendant also con-
ceded literal infringement of all but two elements of claim 1 of the
Stoll patent. The first element not literally infringed was that there
were guide rings and sealing rings at opposite ends of the piston; the
defendant's device had guide rings at opposite ends of the piston, but
only a two-way sealing ring at one end of the piston. The other ele-
ment that was not literally infringed was a sleeve around the piston
that was made of a magnetizable material to reduce magnetic leakage
from the device; the defendant's device used a sleeve made of an alu-
minum alloy instead of a magnetizable material.
123. 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
124. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857, 860-62 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), rev'd, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
125. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 172 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) ("Instead of a pair of sealing rings situated at opposite ends of the
piston, the [accused] devices have a single two-way sealing ring at the end of the
piston that is in contact with the pressure fluid."), rev'd, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
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Illustration From the Stoll Patent
The Federal Circuit first affirmed the judgment of infringement of
both patents under the doctrine of equivalents.126 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, however, and then vacated and remanded
the case in light of the Warner-Jenkinson decision.127 On remand, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of infringement with respect to
the Carroll patent, but remanded to the trial court to determine issues
of prosecution history estoppel with respect to the Stoll patent. 128 The
Federal Circuit then granted a rehearing en banc. In an eighty-four
page opinion with six separate concurring and dissenting opinions, the
Federal Circuit reversed the judgment of infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents with respect to both patents on the grounds that
prosecution history estoppel barred the use of the doctrine of
equivalents because the claims for both patents had been amended.129
The en banc court overruled a line of cases that had applied a flexible
bar to prosecution history estoppel in which the doctrine of
equivalents was not entirely barred by an amendment during patent
prosecution, holding that "prosecution history estoppel acts as a com-
plete bar to the application of the doctrine of equivalents when an
amendment has narrowed the scope of a claim for a reason related to
patentability.130 The Federal Circuit also decided that a narrowing
amendment that was made for any reason related to the statutory re-
quirements for patentability gives rise to prosecution history estoppel
with respect to the amended claim element, regardless of whether the
amendment was required by a patent examiner, made in response to a
rejection, or was initiated by the patent applicant.131
126. Festo Corp., 72 F.3d at 860-62.
127. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 729.
128. Festo Corp., 172 F.3d at 1374, 1380.
129. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 564 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (en banc), rev'd, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
130. Id. at 574.
131. Id. at 566, 568.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a unanimous opin-
ion, vacated the en banc decision of the Federal Circuit and remanded
the case. 13 2 The Supreme Court's decision begins with some general
remarks about the patent system and the rationale for the doctrine of
equivalents:
[T]he nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing
in a patent application.... The language in the patent claims may not capture
every nuance of the invention or describe with complete precision the range of
its novelty. If patents were always interpreted by their literal terms, their
value would be greatly diminished. Unimportant and insubstantial substi-
tutes for certain elements could defeat the patent, and its value to inventors
could be destroyed by simple acts of copying. For this reason, the clearest rule
of patent interpretation, literalism, may conserve judicial resources but is not
necessarily the most efficient rule. The scope of a patent is not limited to its
literal terms but instead embraces all equivalents to the claims described. 1 3 3
The limits of language do not really provide a justification for the
doctrine of equivalents, however. It is almost trite to say that lan-
guage is limited. Perhaps the most famous example of the limits of
language is Justice Stewart's recognition that he was unable to define
obscenity and his conclusion, "I know it when I see it, and the motion
picture in this case is not that."134 But inventions are generally not as
hard to describe as obscenity is to define. In each of the Supreme
Court cases involving the doctrine of equivalents, the English lan-
guage was fully capable of describing the equivalents. 13 5 The failure
of the claims to cover the equivalents in those cases was not due to the
limits of language, but to other factors, especially the limited foresight
of the patent attorneys who drafted the claims too narrowly. As Pro-
fessor Chisum has noted: "Claims are often written by people with
limited resources and time, imperfect expression skills, and incom-
plete understandings of the invention, the prior art that determines
its patentability, and the forms in which it may later be cast."1 3 6 The
real reason for the failure of the claims in the Festo case to cover the
accused device appears to be that they were so long and confusing.
For example, a cursory look at Claim 9 from the Carroll patent shown
in the footnote below, 13 7 reveals how easy it was to lose the unneces-
132. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 742.
133. Id. at 731-32.
134. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
135. The equivalent in Winans would have been covered by adding "substantially" to
the claim for the shape of the cargo bed, and the equivalent in Graver Tank would
have been covered by adding "manganese silicate" to the claim for the welding
flux. Similarly, the equivalent in Warner-Jenkinson would have been covered by
deleting the lower limit on the pH, and the equivalent in Festo would have been
covered by deleting the reference to the sealing rings in the Carroll patent and
the references to the sealing rings and that the sleeve was made of a magnetiza-
ble material in the Stoll patent.
136. Chisum, supra note 90, at 7.
137. Claim 9. A device for moving articles, which comprises:
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sary limitation of "a pair of," rather than "one or more," resilient seal-
ing rings amid the many other details that were required for the
claim. While the rationale that the Festo Court gave for the doctrine
of equivalents was not correct, the limitation of "a pair resilient seal-
ing rings" does appear insubstantial in the context of the rest of the
elements in claim 9 of the Carroll patent, all of which were conceded to
be present in the accused device.
The Court discussed prosecution history estoppel next, and it pro-
vided the following rationale for this doctrine:
Prosecution history estoppel ensures that the doctrine of equivalents re-
mains tied to its underlying purpose. Where the original application once em-
braced the purported equivalent but the patentee narrowed his claims to
obtain the patent or to protect its validity, the patentee cannot assert that he
lacked the words to describe the subject matter in question. The doctrine of
a hollow cylinder formed of non-ferrous material and having opposite
axial ends;
a piston mounted in the interior of the hollow cylinder and reciprocat-
ingly slidable therein, the piston including a central mounting member
disposed axially in the cylinder,
a plurality of cylindrically-shaped permanent magnets mounted on
the central mounting member and spaced apart axially from each other,
each magnet having a bore formed axially there-through for receiving
the central mounting member,
at least one pair of end members mounted on the central mounting
member and disposed on opposite axial sides of the plurality of magnets,
a pair of cushion members formed of resilient material, the cushion
members being situated near opposite axial ends of the central mounting
member to help prevent damage to the piston when the piston contacts
an axial end of the cylinder,
and a pair of resilient sealing rings situated near opposite axial ends
of the central mounting member and engaging the cylinder to effect a
fluid-tight seal therewith;
a body mounted on the exterior of the hollow cylinder and reciprocat-
ingly slidable thereon, the body including a plurality of annularly
shaped permanent magnets surrounding the cylinder and spaced apart
from each other,
the permanent magnets of the piston and body being polarized so as
to magnetically couple the body to the piston whereby movement of the
piston inside the cylinder causes a corresponding movement of the body
outside the cylinder,
the body further including means provided thereon for holding on the
body an article to be moved;
and means for controlling the admission of pressure fluid into the cyl-
inder and exhaust fluid from the cylinder for moving the piston in the
cylinder,
the attractive forces between the permanent magnets of the piston
and the body being such that movement of the piston causes correspond-
ing movement of the body below a predetermined load on the body and
such that above said predetermined load movement of the piston does
not cause corresponding movement of the body.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857, 861 n.2 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (emphasis and paragraphing added), rev'd, 535 U.S. 722 (2002). The
analogous claim in the Stoll patent is similarly long and detailed. See id. at 862
n.3.
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equivalents is premised on language's inability to capture the essence of inno-
vation, but a prior application describing the precise element at issue under-
cuts that premise. In that instance the prosecution history has established
that the inventor turned his attention to the subject matter in question, knew
the words for both the broader and narrower claim, and affirmatively chose
the latter. 1 3
8
The Court thus tied the rationale for prosecution history estoppel to
the rationale for the doctrine of equivalents. Just as the Court's ratio-
nale for the doctrine of equivalents as being based on the limits of
language is not correct, its rationale for prosecution history estoppel is
not entirely convincing.
It is true that if the original application covered the equivalent, the
failure of an amendment to capture the equivalent cannot be blamed
on the limits of language. Instead, the failure of the amendment
likely was due to the drafter's lack of foresight, imperfect understand-
ing of the invention, careless reading of the original claim or amend-
ment, or some other human error. Even though the drafter "knew the
words for both the broader and narrower claim," that does not neces-
sarily mean that the drafter fully understood them and thus "affirma-
tively chose the latter," however.' 39 In fact, it is probable that the
drafter did not fully understand the difference between the original
claim and the amendment, because a patentee has nothing to gain
from a narrowing amendment that goes beyond what is necessary for
allowance and gives up a variation of the invention that would other-
wise be patentable.14 0 Consequently, a narrowing amendment that
unnecessarily limits the scope of patent protection is likely the result
of a mistake, rather than an affirmative choice.
Even if a narrowing amendment is the result of a mistake on the
part of the drafter, it is not unreasonable to hold the patentee to the
amendment. An amendment to a claim that gives up a valuable varia-
tion is analogous to a transfer induced by a mistake.' 4 i If the owner
138. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 734-35.
139. Id. at 735.
140. It is possible for part of an amendment to be necessary to avoid prior art, while
another part is not necessary. For example, in the Warner-Jenkinson case, an
amendment to restrict the pH to an upper limit of 9.0 was required to avoid prior
art, but the patentee gained nothing by restricting the pH to a lower limit of
approximately 6.0. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520
U.S. 17, 22 (1997).
141. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 5(1) (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 1, 2001) ("A transfer induced by mistake is subject to rescission at
the instance of the transferor or a successor in interest."). An amendment of a
claim might also be analogized to a mistake in a contract, particularly if the
amendment was the result of a negotiation between the patentee and patent ex-
aminer in which the patent examiner agreed to issuance of the patent if the pat-
entee narrowed the claim. The rules for avoidance or reformation of a contract on
account of a mistake may differ from reformation of a transfer. A contract may be
voidable on account of a mistake, particularly if the mistake is mutual, as op-
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of Blackacre and Whiteacre executes a deed which conveys Blackacre,
instead of Whiteacre, as a result of a mistake, a court may reform the
deed to reflect the owner's intent. 142 On the other hand, reformation
would not be available if the transfer was intentional, but was the
result of an error in judgment.143 A patentee who files a narrowing
amendment to a claim does so intentionally, even if the patentee does
not comprehend the effect the amendment may have on the scope of
patent protection. Since the narrowing amendment is an error of
judgment, it is not appropriate to allow a patentee to regain the bene-
fit of variations of the invention that the patentee mistakenly
surrendered.
After its general discussion of the policies behind the doctrine of
equivalents and prosecution history estoppel, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed specific questions presented by the case. The first was
whether prosecution history estoppel should be limited to amend-
ments made for the purpose of avoiding prior art. Agreeing with the
Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court held that "a narrowing amend-
ment made to satisfy any requirement of the Patent Act may give rise
to an estoppel."144 It added, however, that a truly cosmetic amend-
ment which does not narrow a claim would not raise prosecution his-
tory estoppel.145 The Court noted that the plaintiff conceded that the
posed to unilateral. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 152-53 (1981).
The requirements for avoiding a contract are more restrictive for unilateral mis-
takes than for mutual mistakes. Id. ch. 6, introductory note at 380. In addition,
a mutual mistake as to expression may warrant reformation of the contract to
reflect the true agreement of the parties. Id. § 155. The analogy of a claim
amendment during patent prosecution to a contract breaks down, however, be-
cause the patentee could not enforce a patent examiner's promise to issue a pat-
ent since a patent may be issued only if the applicant is legally entitled to it. See
35 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
142. See, e.g., Tyler v. Larson, 235 P.2d 39, 41 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) ("It is old and
well-established law that equity ... will reform a voluntary conveyance, where,
by mistake of law or fact, a larger estate or more land has been granted than was
intended to be conveyed; and it is immaterial that the grantee is cognizant of the
mistake. The grantee has given nothing for the conveyance; he is deprived of
nothing; and he cannot complain if the mistake is corrected.").
143. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 5 cmt. c
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) ("Faulty prediction will not support a claim in resti-
tution, and invalidating mistake is to be distinguished from the error in judgment
that is visible in hindsight.").
144. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002).
145. Id. The opinion also suggests that prosecution history estoppel might be limited
to amendments made in response to rejections of claims by patent examiners. It
states:
Estoppel arises when an amendment is made to secure the patent
and the amendment narrows the patent's scope .... A patentee who
narrows a claim as a condition for obtaining a patent disavows his claim
to the broader subject matter, whether the amendment was made to
avoid the prior art or to comply with § 112. We must regard the patentee
as having conceded an inability to claim the broader subject matter or at
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claims for both patents had been amended for reasons related to pat-
entability. Because there was no question that the amendments nar-
rowed the scope of the patents, the Court concluded that prosecution
history estoppel could bar infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.
The Court then proceeded to the question of whether prosecution
history estoppel should result in a complete or flexible bar to the use of
the doctrine of equivalents. Overruling the Federal Circuit, the Court
concluded that a complete bar is inconsistent with the purpose of pros-
ecution history estoppel, which it said is to hold the patentee to infer-
ences that can reasonably be drawn from an amendment of a claim.
The Court explained:
By amending the application, the inventor is deemed to concede that the pat-
ent does not extend as far as the original claim. It does not follow, however,
that the amended claim becomes so perfect in its description that no one could
devise an equivalent. After amendment, as before, language remains an im-
perfect fit for invention. The narrowing amendment may demonstrate what
the claim is not; but it may still fail to capture precisely what the claim is.
1 4 6
As noted previously, 147 the Court's reliance on the limitations of
language to justify the doctrine of equivalents is incorrect. Similarly,
the imperfection of language does not justify the rejection of a com-
plete bar for prosecution history estoppel. Surely, the patentee in the
Festo case understood what "a pair of resilient sealing rings" and "a
cylindrical sleeve made of a magnetizable material" were. The Court
then offered a completely different justification for rejecting the com-
plete bar: the patentee's lack of foresight. Shifting abruptly from rely-
ing on the limitations of language to the unforeseeability of
amendments, the Court continued:
There is no reason why a narrowing amendment should be deemed to relin-
quish equivalents unforeseeable at the time of the amendment and beyond a
least as having abandoned his right to appeal a rejection. In either case
estoppel may apply.
Id. at 737. The patentee had previously argued to the en banc Federal Circuit
that prosecution history estoppel should not apply because its amendments had
not been required by the patent examiner or made in response to a rejection.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 587, 588,
590 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), rev'd, 535 U.S. 722 (2002). The en banc court
rejected the patentee's argument and held that prosecution history estoppel ap-
plies to voluntary amendments as well as amendments made in response to the
patent examiner. Id. at 568. As the en banc court pointed out, there is no reason
to differentiate between amendments related to patentability on the basis of
whether they were initiated by the patentee or the Patent Office. The Supreme
Court did not consider the question whether prosecution history estoppel applied
to voluntary amendments, however. As a result, on remand from the Supreme
Court, the en banc Federal Circuit reinstated its holding with respect to volun-
tary amendments. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344
F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc).
146. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 738.
147. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
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fair interpretation of what was surrendered. Nor is there any call to foreclose
claims of equivalence for aspects of the invention that have only a peripheral
relation to the reason the amendment was submitted. The amendment does
not show that the inventor suddenly had more foresight in the drafting of
claims than an inventor whose application was granted without amendments
having been submitted. 148
The patentee's lack of foresight is a more plausible explanation for the
narrowing amendments in the Festo case than the limitations of lan-
guage. It may not be unreasonable for a patentee to fail to include in
an amended claim variations of the invention that are not readily fore-
seeable or have only a peripheral relation to the purpose for making
the narrowing amendment. Nevertheless, a patentee's failure to in-
clude these variations in the amended claim does not necessarily jus-
tify expanding the scope of patent protection under the doctrine of
equivalents to include the omitted variations any more than an error
in a grantor's judgment justifies reformation of a deed.
Next the Court criticized the Federal Circuit for ignoring Warner-
Jenkinson's direction to be cautious before making changes in the pat-
ent law that would disrupt settled expectations of the inventing com-
munity.149 It is difficult to see how a patentee would have much in
the way of settled expectations with respect to variations of an inven-
tion that were outside the literal scope of the claims, however. The
insubstantial differences and triple identity standards for the doctrine
of equivalents are ambiguous, and a patentee's expectations are fur-
ther unsettled by the doctrine of equivalents being decided by a jury,
rather than a judge. In addition, as the Federal Circuit noted, the
Supreme Court had not previously ruled on whether the complete or
flexible bar rule should be applied,150 and there were conflicting lines
of Federal Circuit decisions, with one line applying a complete bar and
the other line applying a flexible bar.151 Finally, the flexible bar rule
was unpredictable as to which equivalents were barred and which
were not. 152
Nevertheless, after chastising the Federal Circuit for disrupting
settled expectations, the Court proceeded to announce a new standard
148. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 738.
149. Id. at 739. The Warner-Jenkinson opinion did not contain any instructions for
courts not to disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing community, how-
ever. All the opinion said was that the lengthy history of the doctrine of
equivalents supported the Court's refusal to overrule it in the Graver Tank case
and that Congress could overturn the doctrine through legislation at any time.
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997).
150. Festo Corp., 234 F.3d at 569 ("We think it is fair to say that the question of the
scope of equivalents available when prosecution history estoppel applies to a
claim element has not been directly addressed or answered by the Supreme
Court, at least in circumstances where the claim was amended for a known pat-
entability reason.").
151. See id. at 573.
152. See id. at 574.
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for prosecution history estoppel. It held that a patentee could over-
come the presumption that the doctrine of equivalents is barred by
prosecution history estoppel if any of the following three conditions
are met:
The equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time of the application;
the rationale underlying the amendment may bear no more than a tangential
relation to the equivalent in question; or there may be some other reason sug-
gesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described
the insubstantial substitute in question.153
The Court explained that the patentee, as the author of the claim lan-
guage, is expected to draft claims to encompass readily known
equivalents, and a decision to narrow claims by amendment is gener-
ally a disclaimer of the area between the original and amended claim.
It ruled, though, that if any of these three conditions existed, a paten-
tee could not reasonably be found to have surrendered the particular
equivalents. Because the Court could not determine from the record
whether the patentee had surrendered the equivalents that were in-
volved in the Festo case, the Court remanded the case to the Federal
Circuit with directions to determine whether any of these conditions
existed.154
The first condition is whether the equivalent is foreseeable at the
time of the amendment. 155 After-arising technology has been dubbed
"the quintessential example of an enforceable equivalent,156 and ac-
commodating it has been called "a primary justification for the doc-
trine of equivalents."157 Although a number of other cases besides
Festo have discussed the use of the doctrine of equivalents to protect
153. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740-41.
154. Id.
155. The Festo decision uses inconsistent language in the last two quotations above
with respect to the time for unforeseeability. In the first instance, see supra text
accompanying note 148, the Court referred to unforeseeability "at the time of the
amendment," but in the second instance, see supra text accompanying note 153,
the Court referred to unforeseeability "at the time of the application." On re-
mand, the en banc Federal Circuit ruled that the time of amendment was the
relevant time, because that was when the patentee is presumed to have surren-
dered the equivalent. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344
F.3d 1359, 1365 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc).
156. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Impax Labs., Inc., 356 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Smithkline Beechum Corp. v. Excel Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 356 F.3d 1357, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
157. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 619 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also Kinzenbaw
v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("The doctrine of equivalents is
designed to protect inventors from unscrupulous copyists, and unanticipated
equivalents."); Anthony H. Azure, Comment, Festo's Effect on After-Arising Tech-
nology and the Doctrine of Equivalents, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1163-64 (2001)
("The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have both emphasized that a pri-
mary purpose of the doctrine of equivalents is to protect patentees from after-
arising technology.").
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after-arising technology 5 8 and the Federal Circuit has provided two
hypothetical examples (transistors in relation to vacuum tubes and
Velcro® in relation to fasteners),15 9 actual examples of it in the cases
are hard to come by.
Probably the leading example of an after-arising equivalent in the
caselaw is in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States.160 The patent was
for an apparatus for a communications satellite that would automati-
cally orient the satellite so that its antennas pointed toward the earth
and its solar panels faced the sun, using a sensor to detect the satel-
lite's orientation and jets to discharge gas to change the orientation.
The patent's claims called for means to provide an indication of the
satellite's orientation to a location external to the satellite and means
for receiving signals from the external location to control the satellite's
jets. There was no literal infringement of the claims, because the de-
fendant's satellite had a computer on-board to process the data about
the satellite's orientation, rather than one that was external to the
satellite.161 Applying the triple identity test, the Federal Circuit nev-
ertheless found that there was infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. The court ruled that the development of advanced com-
puters and digital communications techniques after the launch of the
plaintiffs satellite enabled the defendant to do on-board what the pat-
ent called for doing on the ground. It held that "an embellishment
made possible by [after-arising] technology ... does not allow the ac-
cused spacecraft to escape the 'web of infringement."'162 It is not
clear, however, that the Hughes Aircraft case really involved technol-
ogy that was not reasonably foreseeable. The claims in issue were ad-
ded by amendment in 1966, the patent was issued seven years later in
1973, and the infringement action was filed only one month after the
patent was issued. 16 3 It is unlikely that the state of technology
changed so rapidly that an on-board computer which was actually
used on a satellite in 1973 was not reasonably foreseeable when the
amendment adding the claims was made in 1966.164 Even if an on-
158. See, e.g., Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303,
1310 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
159. Festo Corp., 344 F.3d at 1369. The invention of transistors revolutionized elec-
tronics, and Velcro® was a significant invention in its field. It seems incongru-
ous, therefore, for the Federal Circuit to offer them as exemplars for the
application of the doctrine of equivalents, when the doctrine's primary purpose is
to extend patent coverage to "insubstantial differences" from the literal language
of the patent claims.
160. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
161. Id. at 1360-61.
162. Id. at 1365.
163. Id. at 1355-56.
164. This view is supported by one of the expert witnesses in the Hughes Aircraft case,
who has noted: "There is some indication that the after-developed technology re-
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board computer was not feasible in 1966, surely it was foreseeable
then that such a development would be possible someday. After-aris-
ing technology that is not reasonably foreseeable may therefore be
more of a theoretical concern than a real one.
A more fundamental problem with extending patent protection to
unforeseeable technology is that it conflicts with the notion that the
scope of a patent should be limited to what the patentee invented and
the statutory requirements that the patent must (1) contain a written
description of the invention, (2) enable a person skilled in the art to
practice it, and (3) distinctly claim the subject matter of the inven-
tion.165 Just as Samuel Morse's patent for the telegraph could not
extend to other uses of electromagnetism for communication that he
did not invent,166 a patentee should not be entitled to protection for
after-arising technology that was unforeseeable at the time of the
amendment to the patent application.167 Clearly, section 112 of title
35 would prohibit a claim for a variation of an invention that was un-
foreseeable to a person of reasonable skill in the art.168 It is paradoxi-
cal that the doctrine of equivalents should extend patent protection to
variations of an invention that could not be expressly claimed. As the
Federal Circuit has said:
[A] patentee should not be able to obtain, under the doctrine of equivalents,
coverage which he could not lawfully have obtained from the PTO by literal
claims. The doctrine of equivalents exists to prevent a fraud on a patent,
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 70 S.Ct.
854, 856, 94 L.Ed. 1097 (1950), not to give a patentee something which he
could not lawfully have obtained from the PTO had he tried.
1 6 9
ferred to in Hughes was available before the time the Federal Circuit thought."
Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent
Law: Questions That Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 727
n.226 (1989); see also id. at 712 n.170 (identifying one of the authors as an expert
witness in the Hughes Aircraft case).
165. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
167. Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the Fu-
ture After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1178 (2004) ("It is fundamental to
American patent law that patentees are not entitled to protection for what they
either did not invent or did not disclose to the public."); see also Michael J.
Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement, and Patent Claim Scope: A
New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1955 (2005)
("We reject the popular notion that the Doctrine of Equivalents is especially ap-
propriate in the case of unforeseeable, later-developed technology because this
justification focuses on the wrong question.").
168. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text; see also Smithkline Beechum
Corp. v. Excel Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 356 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("A]fter-arising technology ... would always be unclaimable [subject] matter.");
Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Impax Labs., Inc., 356 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(same).
169. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed.
Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508
U.S. 83, 92 n.12, 100-02 (1993).
[Vol. 84:11131146
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
The Supreme Court first ruled that the doctrine of equivalents may
reach after-arising technology in the Warner-Jenkinson case,' 70 but
the Festo decision may have elevated the significance of after-arising
technology with respect to the doctrine of equivalents by foreclosing
most other possibilities for overcoming prosecution history estoppel
when there has been a narrowing amendment. Extending patent pro-
tection to after-arising technology therefore threatens to cannibalize
well-established principles that limit the scope of patent protection to
the inventor's actual contributions.
The second condition the Supreme Court identified which would
overcome the presumption that resort to the doctrine of equivalents is
barred is that "the rationale underlying the amendment may bear no
more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question."17 1 On
remand in the Festo case, the Federal Circuit ruled that the patentee
had not shown that the rationale for the amendments concerning the
sealing rings and magnetizable sleeve bore only a tangential relation
to the equivalents.172 The court decided that if the purpose of an
amendment was to avoid prior art that covered the equivalent in-
volved in the case, the rationale for the amendment was not tangen-
tial to the equivalent. 173 This second condition might exist, though, if
a claim originally included a limitation that excluded the equivalent,
and the amendment was not related to that limitation.1 74
The third condition the Supreme Court identified which would
overcome the presumption that resort to the doctrine of equivalents is
barred is that "there may be some other reason suggesting that the
patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the in-
substantial substitute in question."175 On remand, the en banc Fed-
eral Circuit sensibly ruled that this condition must be construed
narrowly.17 6 Otherwise, it would swallow the general rule of prosecu-
tion history estoppel. The Federal Circuit explained:
[This circumstance] is available in order not to totally foreclose a patentee
from relying on reasons, other than unforeseeability and tangentialness, to
show that it did not surrender the alleged equivalent. Thus, the third crite-
rion may be satisfied when there was some reason, such as the shortcomings
170. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997).
171. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740 (2002).
172. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1371-73
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc).
173. Id. at 1369-70.
174. See generally Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1045, 1071 (2001) (arguing that it would be inequitable to
apply a bar on account of an amendment "intended to disclaim a totally different
type of change than the one the defendant made"). For a recent example, see
Insituform Techs. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (narrowing amendment was tangential to the equivalent).
175. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740-41.
176. Festo Corp., 344 F.3d at 1370.
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of language, why the patentee was prevented from describing the alleged
equivalent when it narrowed the claim. When at all possible, determination of
the third rebuttal criterion should ... be limited to the prosecution history
record. 177
Significantly, the only example the court gave for satisfying this condi-
tion was that the limits of language caused the patentee to make the
narrowing amendment. Given the flexibility and power of the English
language, it is unlikely a patentee will ever be successful in showing
that the limits of language were the reason for the narrowing
amendment.
Each of the three conditions that the Supreme Court designated as
overcoming the presumption against the use of the doctrine of
equivalents is narrow. Thus, although the Supreme Court ostensibly
overruled the Federal Circuit's adoption of a complete bar rule for
prosecution history estoppel in favor of a flexible bar, the practical re-
sult of the Festo decision is to severely limit the use of the doctrine of
equivalents where a patentee has filed a narrowing amendment. And
the Federal Circuit narrowed the availability of the doctrine of
equivalents even further in its opinion on remand from the Supreme
Court.
On remand, the Federal Circuit reinstated two of the holdings from
its previous en banc decision that it determined had not been dis-
turbed by the Supreme Court's decision. The first was that a narrow-
ing amendment, whether voluntary or made in response to a rejection
or a request by a patent examiner, would give rise to prosecution his-
tory estoppel if made for a substantial reason related to patentability.
The second holding was that a narrowing amendment is presumed to
be related to patentability unless there is evidence in the prosecution
history record that shows otherwise.17s The Federal Circuit then
stated that under the Supreme Court's ruling, there is a presumption
of a complete bar to the doctrine of equivalents, unless the patentee
proves that there was no surrender of a particular equivalent on ac-
count of one of the three conditions listed in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion. Next, the Federal Circuit held that the issue of whether
prosecution history estoppel applies is an issue of law for the court,
rather than the jury.1 79 Thus, if there has been a narrowing amend-
ment, before a claim for infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents may be presented to the jury, the trial court must rule
that the patentee has either rebutted the presumption that the
amendment was made for a reason related to patentability, or has
shown that one of the three conditions the Supreme Court identified
exists.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1366.
179. Id. at 1367-68.
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The Supreme Court's decisions in the Winans, Graver Tank,
Warner-Jenkinson, and Festo cases have produced a complex body of
law for the doctrine of equivalents. The next Part of this Article sum-
marizes the current state of the law and offers some comments about
the future prospects for the doctrine.
V. THE CURRENT LAW OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
AND ITS FUTURE PROSPECTS
The most striking feature of the current law is the drastic effect
that a narrowing amendment to a patent's claim has on the operation
of the doctrine of equivalents. In the absence of a narrowing amend-
ment, infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is a question for
the jury.o8 0 Literal infringement is also a question for the jury,lS1 of
course, but since the Supreme Court has ruled that claim construction
is an issue of law for the judge,18 2 summary judgment is often availa-
ble with respect to claims for literal infringement. Once the judge has
construed the claims, the judge may be able to determine whether an
accused device comes within their scope as a matter of law in order to
grant summary judgment against the patentee. A claim for infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents presents additional factual is-
sues, such as whether the differences between the accused device and
the claims are insubstantial and whether the triple identity test is sat-
isfied. Consequently, in the absence of a narrowing amendment, sum-
mary judgment is generally not available with respect to claims for
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.18 3 More commonly,
however, there will have been a narrowing amendment, since most
180. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1522 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc) (NI]nfringement under the doctrine of equivalents is an issue of
fact to be submitted to the jury in a jury trial with proper instructions, and to be
decided by the judge in a bench trial."), rev'd on other grounds, Warner-Jenkinson
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
181. E.g., Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 350 F.3d 1235, 1240 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) ("Infringement, both literal and under the doctrine of equivalents, is a
question of fact."); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1323 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) ("A determination of infringement, both literal and under the doctrine
of equivalents, is a question of fact, reviewed for substantial evidence when tried
to a jury.").
182. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) ("We hold
that the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclu-
sively within the province of the court.").
183. Probably the only way that summary judgment is available in the absence of a
narrowing amendment is if application of the doctrine of equivalents would vio-
late the "All Elements" rule by entirely vitiating an element of a claim. Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8 (1997); see also
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 324 F.3d 1308, 1321 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (affirming summary judgment of no infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents on account of the "All Elements" rule).
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patent claims are amended during their prosecution, 8 4 and prosecu-
tion history estoppel will bar use of the doctrine of equivalents, unless
the trial judge finds either that the amendment was not made for a
reason related to patentability or any of the three conditions in the
Festo case were met.
When a claim for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is
tried, the jury will be given instructions on the substantive law. An
example of what a jury may receive is the following Model Patent Jury
Instruction 2.4:
2.4 INFRINGEMENT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
If you decide that [alleged infringer]'s [product] [method] does not literally
infringe an asserted patent claim, you must then decide whether that [[prod-
uct] [method] infringes the asserted claim under what is called the "doctrine of
equivalents."
Under the doctrine of equivalents, the [product] [method] can infringe an
asserted patent claim if it includes [parts] [steps] that are equivalent to the
requirements of the claim. If the [product] [method] is missing an identical or
equivalent [part] [step] to even one requirement of the asserted patent claim,
the [product] [method] cannot infringe the claim under the doctrine of
equivalents. Thus, in making your decision under the doctrine of equivalents,
you must look at each individual requirement of the asserted patent claim and
decide whether the [product] [method] has an identical or equivalent [part]
[[step] to that individual claim requirement.
A [part] [step] of a [product] [method] is equivalent to a requirement of an
asserted claim if the differences between the [part] [step] and the requirement
would be considered not substantial by a person of ordinary skill in the field at
the time of the alleged infringement.
[One way to decide whether any difference between a requirement of an
asserted claim and a [part] [step] of the [product] [method] is not substantial
is to consider whether, as of the time of the alleged infringement, the [part]
[[step] of the [product] [method] performed substantially the same function, in
substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the same result as the
requirement in the patent claim].
[In deciding whether any difference between a claim requirement and the
[[product] [method] is not substantial, you may consider whether, at the time
of the alleged infringement, persons of ordinary skill in the field would have
known of the interchangeability of the [part] [step] with the claimed require-
ment. The known interchangeability between the claim requirement and the
[part] [step] of the [product] [method] is not necessary to find infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents. However, known interchangeability may
support a conclusion that the difference between the [[part] [step] in the [prod-
uct] [method] and the claim requirement is not substantial. The fact that a
[part] [step] of the [product] [method] performs the same function as the claim
requirement is not, by itself, sufficient to show known interchangeability].
Application of the doctrine of equivalents is the exception, not the rule.
Patent claims must give the public fair notice of what was patented, so others
184. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 638 n.3
(Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("Informal inquiry reports
that for simple inventions, at most 10-15% of patents are granted without claim
amendment, although very rarely without argument. For complex inventions the
percentage of unamended applications is vanishingly small.").
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can avoid infringing the patent by designing around the claims. On the other
hand, the patent holder should not be deprived of the benefits of its patent by
others who use the essence of an invention while barely avoiding the literal
language of the patent claims.
[You may not use the doctrine of equivalents to find infringement if you
find that [alleged infringer]'s [product] [method] is the same as what was in
the prior art before the application for the [ patent or what would have been
obvious to persons of ordinary skill in the field in light of what was in the prior
art. A patent holder may not obtain, under the doctrine of equivalents, protec-
tion that it could not have lawfully obtained from the Patent and Trademark
Office. The [patent holder] must prove to you that what it attempts to cover
under the doctrine of equivalents was not in or would not have been obvious
from the prior art]. 1 8 5
While this instruction does a good job of reflecting the confusing
state of the doctrine of equivalents, it is likely to bewilder a jury. The
third and fourth paragraphs contain the insubstantial differences and
triple identity standards for the doctrine, both of which the Supreme
Court criticized in the Warner-Jenkinson case.18 6 The fifth and sixth
paragraphs are equivocal. The fifth paragraph explains that while the
known interchangeability of a part of the accused device may support
a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, it will not
necessarily do so and known interchangeability is not necessary for
infringement. The sixth paragraph sets out the competing considera-
tions with respect to the doctrine of equivalents, but it does not tell the
jury what is required for a finding of equivalents. Similarly, while the
seventh paragraph explains that the doctrine of equivalents cannot
reach variations of an invention that could not be claimed because
they were obvious, it does not specify what variations the doctrine of
equivalents can reach. Thus although Model Patent Jury Instruction
2.4 offers some guidance on what is not covered by the doctrine of
equivalents, nowhere does it clearly specify what elements must be
proven to establish a claim for infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. This is no fault of the Model Instruction, which is an ac-
curate summary of the current law, but instead is a consequence of a
fundamental indeterminacy in the doctrine of equivalents. This can
only result in jury confusion and uncertainty as well as anxiety for a
patentee's competitors who cannot tell whether a variation of an in-
vention that is outside the literal scope of the claims is lawful or
infringing.
Although the Warner-Jenkinson and Festo decisions reaffirmed the
doctrine of equivalents, both narrowed its scope. By articulating a ra-
185. Working Committee, Draft Model Patent Jury Instructions for the Northern Dis-
trict of California, SG028 ALI-ABA 491, 506-07 (2001).
186. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39-40 ("There seems to be substantial agreement
that, while the triple identity test may be suitable for analyzing mechanical de-
vices, it often provides a poor framework for analyzing other products or
processes. On the other hand, the insubstantial differences test offers little addi-
tional guidance as to what might render any given difference 'insubstantial.'").
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tionale for the doctrine, the Festo Court may also have laid the
groundwork for further restrictions on it and possibly the doctrine's
eventual demise. The Festo opinion originally stated that the "doc-
trine of equivalents is premised on language's inability to capture the
essence of innovation,"' 8 7 but it eventually based its recognition of ex-
ceptions to prosecution history estoppel more broadly on whether "at
the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could.., reasonably
be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encom-
passed the alleged equivalent."'88
In future cases, it is possible that the Court may not limit this ra-
tionale to narrowing amendments that are related to patentability,
but may extend it to original patent claims.1 89 If a patentee who
makes a narrowing amendment is presumed to disclaim the
equivalents between the original and amended claim in some circum-
stances, then might there also be circumstances where a patentee who
files an original claim would be presumed to disclaim the equivalents
that are outside of it? To be sure, the disclaiming presumption may be
stronger for an amendment than an original claim. As the Festo Court
noted for the case of a narrowing amendment, "the prosecution history
has established that the inventor turned his attention to the subject
matter in question, knew the words for both the broader and narrower
claim, and affirmatively chose the latter."190 An amendment may
tend to focus the patentee's attention on the particular aspect of the
invention to which the amendment relates, and therefore, the courts
may expect more of the patentee with respect to drafting the amend-
ment to cover all equivalents that the patentee wants to claim.191
Nevertheless, there may be circumstances where one could expect
the patentee to have gotten it right the first time, and not have had to
be prompted by a claim rejection or a patent examiner's request for a
narrowing amendment. The clearest example would be the dedication
rule for disclosed but unclaimed subject matter, in which the patentee
has disclosed a variation of the invention in the written description
but then failed to claim it. The disclosure shows that the patentee was
187. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 734 (2002).
188. Id. at 741.
189. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1056 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (Rader, J., concurring) (advocating the following principle: "the doctrine of
equivalents does not capture subject matter that the patent drafter reasonably
could have foreseen during the application process and included in the claims");
Jeremy T. Marr, Comment, Foreseeability as a Bar to the Doctrine of Equivalents,
2003 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TEcH. F. 10310 (2003) (arguing for a foreseeability bar
to limit the doctrine of equivalents for original claims).
190. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 735.
191. See id. at 741 ("When the patentee has chosen to narrow a claim, courts may
presume the amended text was composed with awareness of [the prosecution his-
tory estoppel] rule and that the territory surrendered is not an equivalent of the
territory claimed.").
1152 [Vol. 84:1113
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
actually aware of the variation, and therefore, the patentee could rea-
sonably have been expected to draft a claim that covered the variation.
In Johnson & Johnston Associates v. R.E. Service Co.,192 the Fed-
eral Circuit held in an en banc decision that a patentee could not as-
sert the doctrine of equivalents for a variation of an invention that
was disclosed in the patent application but was not within the literal
scope of the claims. The patent at issue in the Johnson & Johnston
case was for a component used in manufacturing printed circuit
boards that consisted of an aluminum sheet that was glued to a copper
foil and served as a base for the copper foil. The copper foil was ex-
tremely thin and provided the electrical connections for printed circuit
boards. The aluminum base protected the fragile copper foil from
damage during the manufacturing process, and the aluminum base
was eventually removed from the printed circuit boards and recycled.
The patent application disclosed that while aluminum was the pre-
ferred material for the base, other metals such as stainless steel could
also be used. The patent claims were limited to aluminum, however,
and the defendant's accused product used steel instead of aluminum
for the base. 19 3 The jury returned a verdict of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents, but the Federal Circuit reversed. The court
held that a patentee who disclosed, but did not claim subject matter,
dedicated the unclaimed subject matter to the public, and could not
recapture it with the doctrine of equivalents.194
The dedication rule for disclosed but unclaimed subject matter is
similar to prosecution history estoppel in that both doctrines preclude
reliance on the doctrine of equivalents on account of the patentee's
actions during prosecution. 195 Both have a common rationale because
they represent circumstances where the patentee could reasonably
have been expected to draft a claim that encompassed the equivalents.
The dedication rule for disclosed but unclaimed subject matter in-
volves a failure to cover the equivalents in the original application, as
opposed to in a narrowing amendment, though, and therefore, it in-
volves an extension of the rationale from narrowing amendments to
192. 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc).
193. Id. at 1049-50.
194. Id. at 1054. The Federal Circuit noted that a patentee who inadvertently failed
to claim disclosed subject matter could nevertheless receive patent protection for
it by either filing a continuation application during the pendency of a related
application or else file a reissue application within two years of issuance of the
patent. Id. at 1055.
195. Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., 383 F.3d 1326, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Under
both doctrines, resort to the doctrine of equivalents is precluded based on actions
of the patentee during prosecution evincing a surrender or dedication of subject
matter.").
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original patent applications.196 Another possible extension of this ra-
tionale to original patent applications is suggested by the Federal Cir-
cuit's en banc decision in Honeywell International Inc. v. Hamilton
Sundstrand Corp.197
In the Honeywell case, the Federal Circuit applied prosecution his-
tory estoppel to amendments in which dependent claims were rewrit-
ten as independent claims when the independent claims to which the
dependent claims referred were cancelled. Patent claims are com-
monly written in groups in which the first claim (the independent
claim) is the broadest, and subsequent claims (the dependent claims)
incorporate the first claim by reference and include additional limita-
tions. 198 If a patent examiner rejects an independent claim because of
prior art that does not affect the dependent claims, the patentee may
cancel the rejected independent claims and rewrite the dependent
claims as independent claims which include all the limitations of the
original independent claim, and then the new independent claims may
be allowed. The Federal Circuit held in the Honeywell case that
amendments in which dependent claims were rewritten as indepen-
dent claims were narrowing amendments for purposes of Festo, and
therefore, prosecution history estoppel could apply to equivalents that
fell between the original independent and dependent claims.1 99 This
result is consistent with the rationale for prosecution history estoppel
that the Supreme Court articulated in Festo, because rewriting a de-
pendent claim in independent form ought to focus the patentee's at-
tention on the differences between the original independent and
dependent claims so that the patentee could reasonably be expected to
claim the equivalents. 20 0
The dissenting opinion in the Honeywell case complained that the
majority's holding "will simply drive patent applicants away from de-
pendent claims."20 It appears that the dissent was assuming that
patentees could avoid losing the benefit of the doctrine of equivalents
196. Raj S. Dav6, A Mathematical Approach to Claim Elements and the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 16 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 507, 516 (2003) ("Arguably, Johnson & John-
ston extends the concept of prosecution history estoppel.").
197. 370 F.3d 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
198. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 4 (2000) ("[A] claim in dependent form shall contain a refer-
ence to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the
subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorpo-
rate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.").
199. Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1144. The Federal Circuit remanded to the trial court for
a determination of whether the patentee could overcome the presumptive surren-
der of equivalents. Id.
200. Cf Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 735
(2002) (stating that by making a narrowing amendment, "the inventor turned his
attention to the subject matter in question, knew the words for both the broader
and narrower claim, and affirmatively chose the latter").
201. Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1146 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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by using only independent claims. But if the correct focus is on
whether the patentee could "reasonably be expected to have drafted a
claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent,"
there should be no distinction between whether a dependent claim
was rewritten as an independent claim and allowed after the cancella-
tion of the independent claim on which the dependent claim was
based, or a broader independent claim was cancelled and a narrower
independent claim was allowed. The patentee's ability to capture the
equivalent would be the same whether a dependent claim or a nar-
rower independent claim was used. Because distinguishing between a
dependent claim and a narrower independent claim would exalt form
over substance,202 it is likely that the Federal Circuit would conclude
that they should be treated the same way.2 0 3 If the Federal Circuit
reached this conclusion, it would then have extended the Festo ratio-
nale beyond narrowing amendments to original claims in patent
applications.
The cases of disclosed but unclaimed subject matter and an inde-
pendent claim followed by narrower independent claims both involve
instances where the patent application itself indicates that the paten-
tee could reasonably have been expected to include an equivalent in
the claims. Other parts of the prosecution history besides the patent
application might also show that the patentee was aware of an
equivalent, and in future cases, the Federal Circuit might extend the
dedication rule20 4 from Johnson & Johnston to any disclosures in the
prosecution history. Whether the Federal Circuit would extend the
dedication rule to permit the patentee's actual knowledge of the
equivalent to be proved by evidence outside the prosecution history is
another matter, however. On the one hand, extrinsic evidence of the
patentee's knowledge of an equivalent could provide a basis for bar-
ring the patentee from asserting the doctrine of equivalents because
the patentee could reasonably have been expected to draft claims to
encompass the equivalents. On the other hand, the extrinsic evidence
would not be in the public record, and so, relying on it could produce
uncertainty as to the scope of patent protection. It would therefore be
more appropriate to use the standard of a person of ordinary skill in
the art,2 05 instead of the patentee's actual knowledge, to decide
202. Cf. Barnes's Lessee v. Irwin, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 199, 202 (1793) ("The substance, and
not the form, ought principally to be regarded.").
203. See Wing H. Liang, Note, Honeywell: The Straw That May Just Break the Inven-
tor's Back, 26 CARDozo L. REV. 2655, 2685-86 (2005) (stating that prosecution
history estoppel would apply to independent claims).
204. See supra text accompanying note 192-96.
205. Cf. Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) ("[E]quivalence [is] evaluated from the perspective of one of ordinary
skill in the art.").
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whether the patentee could reasonably have been expected to draft
claims to encompass the equivalents.
If the rationale from Festo was extended from narrowing amend-
ments to original patent claims, there would be little left of the doc-
trine of equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents would then be
restricted to after-acquired technology or narrow circumstances where
there was some other reason that the patentee could not have been
expected to describe the equivalent in the patent application. 20 6 As
previously noted,20 7 providing patent protection for after-acquired
technology conflicts with well-established principles of patent law that
restricts the scope of patent protection to the inventor's contribution.
It would create a Catch-22 for the doctrine of equivalents to be limited
to unforeseeable variations of an invention that are outside the scope
of patent protection because the patentee could not foresee them. The
protection for after-acquired technology is therefore not likely to sur-
vive for long, and when it finally fades away, the doctrine of
equivalents will be gone, too.
VI. CONCLUSION
There was a good rationale for the doctrine of equivalents 150
years ago when the Supreme Court decided Winans v. Dinmead.20 8
But the development of patent claims to stake out the scope of patent
protection has made the doctrine obsolete. By producing uncertain
benefits for patentees, the arcane doctrine imposes substantial costs
on their competitors who cannot predict what the scope of patent pro-
tection will turn out to be. The doctrine's uncertain application also
contributes to the high cost of patent litigation. Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court has twice reaffirmed the doctrine in the past ten years,
because it is "a firmly entrenched part of the settled rights protected
by the patent."20 9 Legal inertia may be powerful, but it will not sus-
tain the doctrine of equivalents forever. As Justice Holmes put it
eighty years ago:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past.2 1 0
206. The other exception noted in the Festo case was that "the rationale underlying
the amendment may bear no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in
question." Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
740 (2002). This would not apply to original patent claims.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 165-69.
208. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
209. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 733.
210. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167,
187 (1920).
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In the course of reaffirming the doctrine of equivalents in the
Warner-Jenkinson and Festo cases, the Supreme Court significantly
narrowed its application through the use of prosecution history estop-
pel. The Supreme Court attempted to justify the doctrine of
equivalents on the basis of the limits of language. But the limits of
language are not what prevents a patentee from drafting claims that
encompass variations of an invention that are later practiced by a
competitor. Instead, the patent drafter's lack of foresight is the cul-
prit. Language may be incapable of defining the doctrine of
equivalents, but that is the result of the doctrine's incoherence, rather
than the fault of language. The other rationale that the Supreme
Court has given for the doctrine is that there may be circumstances,
such as the possibility of the after-acquired technology, such that a
patentee could not reasonably be expected to draft a claim to encom-
pass a variation of the invention that is equivalent to what is claimed.
This rationale portends further narrowing of the doctrine and perhaps
its eventual demise. Thus, the future for the doctrine of equivalents is
less than promising.
